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Blockchain (BICh)

Fully Distributed Systems: Introduction and Algorithms

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Recall Transparency Principles (DSy, FS22)

- Distributed system should hide its distributed nature
 - Location transparency users should not be aware of the physical location
 - Access transparency users should access resources in a single, uniform way
 - Replication transparency users should not be aware about replicas, it should appear as a single resource
 - Concurrent transparency users should not be aware of other users



More/other transparencies here, here, here



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Distributed Management and Retrieval of Data

- Essential challenge in (most) distributed / P2P systems?
 - Location of a data item among systems distributed
 - Where shall the item be stored?
 - How can the item be found?
 - Scalability: keep the complexity for communication and storage scalable
 - Robustness and resilience in case of faults and frequent changes



Data Item D

Comparison of Strategies for Data Retrieval

- Strategies to store and retrieve data items in distributed systems
 - Central server (e.g., service registry, reverse proxy although main use case is load balancing)
 - Flooding search (e.g., layer 2 broadcasting, wireless mesh networks, Bitcoin)
 - Distributed indexing (Tor, Bittorrent, IPFS, Apache Cassandra, Dynamo, Atek [discontinued])



Data Item D

4 Blockchain

Central Server

- Simple strategy: Central Server (can be powerful vertical scaling!)
 - Server stores information about locations
 - 1) Node A (provider) tells server that it stores item D
 - 2) Node B (requester) asks server S for the location of D



"A stores D"

EDB Advanced Server 12 (Redwood mode) TPS vs. Connections

Approach I: Central Server

- Advantages
 - Search complexity of O(1) "just ask the server"
 - Complex and fuzzy queries are possible
 - Simple and fast
- Problems
 - No Scalability
 - O(N) node state in server
 - O(N) network and system load of server
 - Single point of failure or attack
 - (Single) central server not suitable for systems with massive numbers of users
- But overall, ...
 - Best principle for small and simple applications!



Connections

https://www.enterprisedb.com/blog/pgbench-performance-benchmark-postgresql-12-and-edb-advanced-server-12

- AMD EPYC: 48 core, 384GB RAM, 4xNVM SSD
 - ~70k TPS



Approach II: Flooding

- Fully-distributed Approach
 - · Opposite approach of approach I
 - No information on location of a content
- Retrieval of data
 - No routing information for content
 - · Necessity to ask as much systems as possible / necessary
 - Approaches
 - Highest degree search: quick search through large areas
 - Random walk
 - Flooding: high traffic load on network, scalability issues (mechanism required to stop spamming, e.g. TX fee)
 - No guarantee to reach all nodes





Approach II: Flooding Search

- Fully Decentralized Approach: Flooding Search
 - No information about location of data in the intermediate systems
 - Flood with search term, or flood all the data (Bitcoin)
 - Flood all the data: search local



Blockchain

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- 1) Node B (requester) asks neighboring nodes for item D
- 2-4) Nodes forward request to further nodes (breadth-first search / flooding)
- 5) Node A (provider of item D) sends D to requesting node B



Motivation Distributed Indexing (1)





Motivation Distributed Indexing (1)





Distributed Indexing (1)

- Goal is scalable complexity for
 - Communication effort: O(log(N)) hops





Distributed Indexing (2)

- Approach of distributed indexing schemes
 - Data and nodes are mapped into same address space
 - Nodes maintain routing information to other nodes
 - Definitive statement of existence of content
- Problems
 - Maintenance of routing information required
 - Fuzzy queries not primarily supported (e.g., wildcard searches)





Comparison of Lookup Concepts

• Big O notation: classify computer algorithms

System	Per Node State	Communication Overhead	Fuzzy Queries	No false negatives	Robustness / horizontal scalable
Central Server	O(N)	O(1)			()
Flooding	O(1)	O(N)		()	
Distributed Hash Tables	O(log N)	O(log N)	()		



Fundamentals of Distributed Hash Tables

- Challenges for designing DHTs
 - Desired Characteristics
 - Reliability / Scalability
 - Equal distribution of content among nodes
 - Crucial for efficient lookup of content
 - Permanent adaptation to faults, joins, exits of nodes
 - Assignment of responsibilities to new nodes
 - Re-assignment and re-distribution of responsibilities in case of node failure or departure

- Distributed Hash Table
 - Consistent hashing → nodes responsible for hash value intervals
 - More peers = smaller responsible intervals
- Hash Table [link]
 - Modulo hashing
 - Bucket = hash(x) mod n
 - If n changes, remapping / bucket changes
 - N changes if capacity is reached
 - Remapping is expensive in DHT!
 - DHTs reassign responsibility



Distributed Management of Data

- **1.** Mapping of nodes and data into same address space
- Peers and content are addressed using flat identifiers (IDs)
 - E.g., Address is public key (256bit) or SHA256 of public key. Content ID = SHA256(content)
- Common address space for data and nodes
- Nodes are responsible for data in certain parts of the address space
- Association of data to nodes may change since nodes may disappear

2. Storing / Looking up data in the DHT

- Store data = first, search for responsible node
 - Not necessarily known in advance
- Search data = first, search for responsible node



Association of Address Space with Nodes

- Each node is responsible for part of the value range
 - Often with redundancy (overlapping of parts)
 - Continuous adaptation
 - Real (underlay) and logical (overlay) topology are uncorrelated





Node 3485 is responsible for data

items in range 2907 to 3485

(in case of a Chord-DHT)

Routing to a Data Item

- Locating the data / Routing to a K/V-pair
 - Start lookup at arbitrary node of DHT



Routing to a Data Item

- Getting the content
 - K/V-pair is delivered to requester
 - Requester analyzes K/V-tuple (and downloads data from actual location in case of indirect storage)





Association of Data with IDs – Direct Storage

- How is content stored on the nodes?
 - Example:

H("my data") = 3107 is mapped into DHT address space

- Direct storage
 - Content is stored in responsible node for H("my data")
 - → Inflexible for large content o.k., if small amount data (~KB) or used internally





Association of Data with IDs – Indirect (tracker) Storage

- Indirect storage
 - Nodes in a DHT store tuples like (key,value)
 - Key = Hash("my data") \rightarrow 2313
 - Value is often real storage address of content:
 (IP, Port) = (134.2.11.140, 4711)
 - More flexible for large data, but one step more to reach content





Join/Leave

- Joining of a new node
 - 1) Calculation of node ID (normally random / or based on PK)
 - 2) New node contacts DHT via arbitrary node (bootstrap node)
 - 3) Lookup of its node ID (routing)
 - 4) Copying of K/V-pairs of hash range (in case of replication)
 - 5) Notify neighbors
- Failure of a node
 - Use of redundant K/V pairs (if a node fails)
 - Use of redundant / alternative routing paths
 - Key-value usually still retrievable if at least one copy remains

- Departure of a node
 - Copying of K/V pairs to corresponding nodes
 - Can be before or after unbinding
 - Friendly unbinding from routing environment
 - If unbinding is unfriendly, need for keep-alive messages





Kademlia

- Several approaches to build DHT
 - Distance metric as key difference
 - Chord, Pastry: numerical closeness
 - CAN: multidimensional numerical closeness
 - Kademlia: XOR metric
- Kademlia designed in 2002 by Maymounkov and Mazières
 - Many implementations, application specific
 - BitTorrent (tracker), IPFS, Tor Onion Services
- Parallel queries
 - For one query, α (alpha) concurrent lookups are sent
 - More traffic load, but lower response times

- Preference towards old contacts
 - Study has shown that the longer a node has been up, the more likely it is to remain up another hour
 - Resistance against DoS attacks by flooding the network with new nodes
- Network maintenance
 - In Chord: active fixing of fingers
 - In Kademlia: active maintenance
- DHT-based overlay network using the XOR distance metric
 - Symmetrical routing paths $(A \rightarrow B == B \rightarrow A)$
 - due to XOR(A,B) == XOR (B,A)



Construction of Routing Table

- Each Kademlia node and data item has unique identifier
 - 160 bit (SHA-1)
 - Nodes: Node ID (160bit)
 - Can be calculated from IP address or public key, and data item using secure hash function, or just random
 - Data items: Keys (160bit), hash of data item
- Keys are located on the node whose node ID is closest to the key
 - Knows neighbors well, further nodes not that much
 - Kademlia: 160 buckets with size 20 (8)
 - If distance can be represented in m bits, bucket m will be used

XOR Distance Calculation: ID Node A: 110101 ID Node B: 010001 $d_{xOR}(A,B) = d(110101,010001)$ 1 1 0 1 0 1 XOR 0 1 0 0 0 1 \mathbf{V} 1 0 0 1 0 0 $d_{xor}(A,B) = 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0_2 = 36_{10}$



Kademlia Example

• 2³, max size 8, #6 searches for 3

1	2	3	
7	4 (or 5)	0 (or 1, 2)	

Routing Table of #6 6 xor 3 = 101b

• Neighbors of 6, if k=1

1	2	3
1	2	4 (or 5, 6, 7)

Routing Table of #0 0 xor 3 = 11b

- Search for 3, ask 0, neighbors of 0
- Ask 2, neighbors of 2



 Ask 2, 2 replies 0. 6 figures that there is no closer node, 2 is the closest one (2 xor 3 =1)





TomP2P

- TomP2P is a P2P framework/library
 - Unmaintained
 - Implements DHT (structured), broadcasts ٠ ([un]structured), direct messages (can implement super-peers)
 - NAT handling: UPNP, NATPMP, relays, hole ٠ punching (work in progress)
 - Direct / indirect (tracker / mesh) storage ٠
 - Direct / indirect replication (churn prediction ٠ and ~rsync)
- Yes, this is the first Android device, HTC Dream, Sept. 2009



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Fully Decentralized Systems

Sybil nodes

- Always consider Sybil attacks
 - TomP2P, BitTorrent, etc.
 - Data can always disappear
 - Know when data changed

Honest nodes

- Sybil attack
 - Create large number of identities
 - Larger than honest nodes
 - Control "close" nodes in a DHT
 - Isolate nodes
- Prevention [source]
 - Creation of identities costs money
 - Always assume data from other nodes may be missing
 - Bitcoin chain of block, if block is missing, you notice
 - Chain of trust / reputation



You

Attacking the DHT

- Example
- Create a key for a data item close to the target: Number160.createHash(data).xor(new Number160(0)) – distance 0, perfect match Number160.createHash(data).xor(new Number160(1)) – distance 1 Number160.createHash(data).xor(new Number160(2)) – distance 2
- Or create key of node close to the target new PeerBuilder(new Number160(RND)).ports(port).start(), where RND is Number160.createHash(data).xor(new Number160(0)) Number160.createHash(data).xor(new Number160(1))
- Peer can then answer there is no data
- For previously known values / peers (known public key)
 - Cannot change data, but make it disappear



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Redundancy in DHTs

- Replication
 - Enough replicas
 - Direct replication
 - Originator peer is responsible
 - Periodically refresh replicas
 - Example: tracker that announces its data



- Problem
 - Originator offline → replicas disappear.
 Content has TTL





Originator of X

Close peers to X



Redundancy in DHTs

- Indirect Replication
 - The closest peer is responsible, originator may go offline vs any close peers are responsible
 - Periodically checks if enough replicas exist
 - Detects if responsibility changes



- Problem
 - Requires cooperation between responsible peer and originator
 - Multiple peers may think they are responsible for different versions → eventually solved





Originator of X

Close peers to X



Replication and Consistency

- DHTs have weak consistency
 - Peer A put X.1
 - Peer B gets X.1
 - Peer B modifies it puts B.2
- Same time (time in distributed systems):
 - Peer C gets X.1
 - Peer C modifies it puts C.2
- Replication makes it worse
 - Consistency: generic issue in distributed systems, requires typically coordinator
- Multi-Paxos, Raft, ZooKeeper \rightarrow Leader Election



- vDHT: CoW, versions, 2PC, replication, software transactional memory (STM) → for consistent updates. Works for light churn
 - No locking, no timestamps (replication time may have an influence)
 - Every update new version
 - get latest version, check if all replica peers have latest version, if not wait and try again
 - put prepared with data and short TTL, if status is OK on all replica peers, go ahead, otherwise, remove the data and go to step 1.
 - put confirmed, don't send the data, just remove the prepared flag
 - Leader is the originator
 - In case of heavy churn, API user needs to resolve

