



OST

Eastern Switzerland
University of Applied Sciences

Blockchain (BlCh)

Security Considerations

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
Anonymity



- Ransomware
 - Encrypt files, delete original
 - Only decrypt if payed in BTC
- Pay or not pay?
 - Not pay and not restore data
 - Pay and restore data
 - Pay and not restore data
 - “In research for this article ZDnet traced four bitcoin addresses posted (and re-posted) in forums by multiple CryptoLocker victims, showing movement of 41,928 BTC between October 15 and December 18.” ([source](#))


Anonymity

- BitcoinJ: Committed bloom filters for improved wallet performance and SPV security
- HEURISTIC 1
 - If two (or more) addresses are inputs to the same transaction, they are controlled by the same user; i.e., for any transaction t , all $pk \in \text{inputs}(t)$ are controlled by the same user.




Anonymity

- HEURISTIC 2.
 - The one-time change address is controlled by the same user as the input addresses; i.e., for any transaction t , the controller of $\text{inputs}(t)$ also controls the one-time change address $\text{pk} \in \text{outputs}(t)$ (if such an address exists).




Anonymity

- HEURISTIC 3
 - Multisig wallets usually use p2sh change, but the recipient rarely uses p2sh, which allows to determine the correct change output with high probability.




Anonymity

- OPTIMAL CHANGE HEURISTIC
 - The assumption is that wallet software does not spend outputs unnecessarily. Therefore the change value is smaller than any of the spent outputs. Because if the change was larger than one output then this output would be left out and the change would be reduced by the output's value.






Anonymity

- CONSUMER HEURISTIC
 - Consumer wallets only create transactions with two outputs. Therefore, if an output is spent by a transaction with 3 outputs it is not change.
 - [WalletExplorer](#) / [Chainalysis](#)



Anonymity

 Difficulty	 Height	 Hashrate	 Emission
317701477090	2501094	2647.5 Mh/s	18035473

Block < 2501093 > 5f2d7999af3fae92ab5d41e72c577695198233536c48d2e6b38e5ba67ffacec4

↓ Height	2501093	↔ Cumulative Difficulty	150788615910068714
🕒 Timestamp	2021-11-25 16:46:28 UTC	↔ Total Generated Coins	18035473.330903988332
📄 Block difficulty	317701477090	≡ Transactions	57
↔ Block size (bytes)	94929		

Coinbase Transaction			
Hash	Amount	Bytes	
883cc6d3bd76ee6325caf5a63254498c6ea273ec70115ba8c2f6be07033c45c	0.786341480203	115	
Transactions (57)			
Hash	Output total	Fee	Bytes
3c22179723fd0aa8dfb80944b7ce5e994496eae642e6bba923d54b871572dbc3	📧 confidential	0.000458330000	2492
23526256babd78ae98e91379825c5d7c7f07cf30fdffa4f43ee019de27c339de	📧 confidential	0.000258060000	1974
23e364d0169c2b590b362fe7dc8a9788e47c041be1dc12c2357f8ddc084ea8f0	📧 confidential	0.000190080000	1454

- Monero

- Blockexplorer

- No scripting (no smart contracts)

- Proof of work algorithm

- Due to cryptographic algorithms, unknown: addresses trading **monero**, transaction amounts, address balances, or transaction histories

- Ring signatures, zero-knowledge proof, stealth addresses: unclear which ring member actually signed

- 14.11.2020: IRS Will Pay Up To \$625,000 If You Can Crack Monero, Other Privacy Coins [[link](#)]

- Malware mining, due to CPU bound PoW

- Some ransomware groups only accepts Monero

Security Concerns (Theft)

- Bitcoinica – security issue: Linode (cloud provider)
 - gaining root access using the service provider's systems
 - 46K BTC stolen (in 2012 ~\$228,000, now ~\$308 mio)
- 2 month later: 19K BTC stolen from Bitcoinica
 - “hackers webserver (Rackspace) by resetting a password, most likely through an automated e-mail.”
- Bitfloor, as US-based Bitcoin exchange site
 - 24K BTC stolen (in 2012 ~250'000\$)
 - attacker gained accesses to an unencrypted backup of the wallet keys
- Bitcoin-Central
 - Some hundreds Bitcoins stolen
 - Password reset – issue with **OVH?**
- BitInstant: 333 BTC stolen ~ \$12'000
 - Domain registrar Site5: redirected DNS
 - “Armed with knowledge of my place of birth and mother's maiden name alone (both facts easy to locate on the public record) they convinced Site5 staff to add their email address to the account and make it the primary login”
- **DeFi Hacks** (2020-)
- List of Major Bitcoin Heists, Thefts, Hacks, Scams, and Losses [[link](#)] (old)

Security Concerns (Theft)

- Outsourcing infrastructure to the cloud
 - outsource the risk!
- E.g., Bitcoin-Central, Bitcoinica could have had a “secure” system during the theft
- DDoS against Mt. Gox – “Layer 7” April 2013
 - Trading engine lag ~75min.
 - Panic sells – market drop
- Mt.Gox closed, Bitfloor closed, Bitcoin24 closed, many others
- 45 percent of Bitcoin exchanges end up closing [[link](#)]
- 40 Bitcoin exchange sites analyzed over 3 years, 18 closed
- 5 closed exchange sites - no reimbursement

Beware the Middleman: Empirical Analysis of Bitcoin-Exchange Risk

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
Abstract. Bitcoin has enjoyed wider adoption than any previous crypto-currency; yet its success has also attracted the attention of fraudsters who have taken advantage of operational insecurity and transaction irreversibility. We study the risk investors face from Bitcoin exchanges, which convert between Bitcoins and hard currency. We examine the track record of 40 Bitcoin exchanges established over the past three years, and find that 18 have since closed, with customer account balances often wiped out. Fraudsters are sometimes to blame, but not always. Using a proportional hazards model, we find that an exchange’s transaction volume indicates whether or not it is likely to close. Less popular exchanges are more likely to be shut than popular ones. We also present a logistic regression showing that popular exchanges are more likely to suffer a security breach.

Keywords: Bitcoin, currency exchanges, security economics, cybercrime

Security Concerns (Mt.Gox – Lecture 09)

- Transaction malleability
 - Known since May 2011
 - Transactions are identified by the SHA256
 - Malleability = change data in transaction to change transaction hash, but transaction remains valid (signature still verifiable)
- Signature Malleability
 - Signature is DER-encoded ASN.1, OpenSSL
 - OpenSSL parser not strict (~HTML browser)
- scriptSig Malleability
 - Signature may not sign any data structure containing itself
 - Use OP_0, replace later. Script may be encoded in several different ways

- Chained transactions (not broadcasted yet)
 - References to TX with hash and index



**Broadcasted
and valid**

Security Concerns (Silk Road)

- Founded in February 2011 by “Dread Pirate Roberts”
- Mainly illegal goods (“eBay for drugs”)
- Connection through Tor hidden service, payment in Bitcoins
- 1.2m USD revenue per month, 92K USD commissions per month
- Up to 150’000 active customers ~4’000 vendors 900’000 registered users
- “... \$1.2 billion in transactions were made through the Silk Road.”

The screenshot shows the Silk Road anonymous market website. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the Silk Road logo (a camel), the text "Silk Road anonymous market", and user statistics: "messages 0 | orders 0 | account B0.0000". A search bar is present with a "Go" button. Below the navigation bar, there is a "Shop by Category" sidebar listing various product categories and their counts, such as "Drugs 8,984", "Cannabis 2,191", "Dissociatives 106", "Ecstasy 912", "Intoxicants 34", "Opioids 299", "Other 36", "Precursors 60", "Prescription 2,847", "Psychedelics 877", "Stimulants 943", "Tobacco 228", "Apparel 568", "Art 59", "Biotic materials 1", "Books 1,197", "Collectibles 38", "Computer equipment 109", "Custom Orders 53", "Digital goods 837", "Drug paraphernalia 459", "Electronics 160", "Erotica 715", "Fireworks 7", "Food 11", "Forgeries 124", "Hardware 49", "Home & Garden 23", "Jewelry 79", "Lab Supplies 24", "Lotteries & games 146", "Medical 46", "Money 217", "Musical instruments 2", "Packaging 72", "Services 145", and "Sporting goods 2".

The main content area displays a grid of product listings. Each listing includes an image, a title, a description, and a price in Bitcoin (B0). A red banner at the top of the main area reads "Click here for an important security announcement". On the right side, there is a "From the forum" section with several links to forum posts.

Product listings visible include:

- Cherry Pi: 7 GRAMS OF MEDICAL CHERRY PI, B0.9466
- Primobolan (LA Pharma), 30 tabs x 25mg, B0.1883
- 300 x Ritalin 10 mg, B8.4756
- (1) 25i-NBOMe - 1100ug/ea - Blotter, B0.0417
- Modafinil 200mg - 300 Pills, B2.8871
- Special 5x 50 (250) Pills EPHEDRINE HCL Packets, B4.0187
- 1 gram PURE RAW COLUMBIAN COCAINE - HQ, B1.6015
- 500mg of 3-MMC ultra pure Pentadone Crystallz, B0.3030
- Masteron 10ml 100mg/ml - Arrival Guaranteed, B0.5677
- Pineapple Haze *1.5 Gram Listing*, B0.1701
- <Quality-MDMA!!! 1 Gram 1000mg, B1.9064
- 3 Ounces (84g) AAA Organic Buds--Pick a Strain, B7.6484

Chemical structure of 3-MMC (3-methylmethcathinone) is shown next to its listing: CC(N)CC1=CC=C(C=C1)C

Security Concerns (Silk Road)

- Take down Oct 2, 2013
 - Could link a forum account of Silk Road to a Gmail account [link]
 - Logged in to his account
- Assets seized:
 - Over 144'000 BTC from Ulbricht, 5 million USD from MtGox frozen
 - “In fact, the 174,000 or so bitcoins that the FBI controls now account for about 1.5% of all bitcoins in circulation.” [link]
- Successors already in place
 - Silk Road 2.0, Silk Road 3.0, OpenBazaar?



Ross Ulbricht

- Double life sentence plus forty years without the possibility of parole ([wikipedia](#))
- Drug market place vs. free market experiment with user anonymity
 - “people should have the right to buy and sell whatever they wanted so long as they were not hurting anyone else”
- **03.10.2018** Lyn Ulbricht, leader of the Free Ross campaign
 - First-time, nonviolent offender
 - One of the 17,000 nonviolent drug offenders serving life in prison in the US

- [freeross.org](#)
 - “A former DEA agent pleaded guilty Wednesday to money laundering, obstruction of justice and extortion for his actions during the two years he spent investigating the online drug marketplace Silk Road as an undercover agent.” ([source](#))

