



OST

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Distributed Systems (DSy)

Introduction

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14.02.2023

Learning Goals



- Distributed systems add complexity. Avoid complexity!
- Why do we need distributed systems?
 - 1) Scaling (if one machine is not enough)
 - 2) Location (to move closer to the user)
 - 3) Fault-tolerance (HW will fail eventually)

Distributed Systems Motivation

- Why Distributed Systems


- Scaling

- Vertical (scale up), more memory, faster CPU
 - Horizontal (scale out), more machines
 - Apple has 75'000 Apache Cassandra nodes storing 10 petabytes of data in 2015 [[source](#)]



- Economics

- Initially scaling vertically is cheaper, until you max out HW
 - Current servers are fast: **96cores** ~ 70k TPS



Distributed Systems Motivation

Horizontal Scaling

- + Lower cost with massive scale
- + Easier to add fault-tolerance
- + Higher availability
- Adaption of software required
- More complex system, more components involved

Vertical Scaling


- + Lower cost with small scale
- + No adaption of software required
- + Less complexity
- HW limits for scaling
- Risk of HW failure causing outage
- More difficult to add fault-tolerance

Vertical Scaling Performance

- Moore's Law – nr. of transistors doubles every 2 years (other predictions, doubling chip performance every 18 month)
- **Dead in 2025? Or 2045?**
- **Forbes 1995:** "The price per transistor will bottom out sometime between 2003 and 2005. From that point on, there will be no economic point to making transistors smaller. So Moore's Law ends in seven years."
- **AMD EPYC, 96 cores**
- **Apple M1 Ultra ~114b**

Moore's Law: The number of transistors on microchips doubles every two years

Moore's law describes the empirical regularity that the number of transistors on integrated circuits doubles approximately every two years. This advancement is important for other aspects of technological progress in computing – such as processing speed or the price of computers.




Data source: Wikipedia (wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor_count)

OurWorldinData.org – Research and data to make progress against the world's largest problems.

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Vertical Scaling Performance

- Nielsen's Law: a high-end user's connection speed grows by 50% per year
- **Bandwidth grows slower than computer power**
 - Telecoms companies are conservative
 - Users are reluctant to spend much money on bandwidth
 - The user base is getting broader
- Optimize for bandwidth not for CPU
- **Zmap** complete scan of the IPv4 address space in under 5 minutes
- Init7: **Fiber7-X2** 25/25 Gbit ~65CHF/month



<https://www.nngroup.com/articles/law-of-bandwidth/>

		Annualized Growth Rate	Compound Growth Over 10 Years
Nielsen's law	Internet bandwidth	50%	57×
Moore's law	Computer power	60%	100×



Vertical Scaling Performance

- Kryder's Law: disk density doubling every 13 month

- «Soon hard drives will migrate into phones, still cameras, PDAs, cars and everyday appliances»


<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/kryders-law/> ,
Aug. 2005

- User behavior changed


- SSD, speed is important

- Cloud – Dropbox, Spotify

- Streaming



<http://blog.dshr.org/2016/05/the-future-of-storage.html>




Source: <https://jcmits.net/flashprice.htm>

Vertical Scaling Performance

- Vertical scaling
 - HW today is fast!
 - Database benchmark with a fast machine in 2020 (96 cores, 384GB RAM, 4 x NVMe SSD)
 - 70k TPS
- Best principle for small and simple applications!
- Simple website with a few DB calls is not HW intensive
 - But: ML, Gaming (**cloud gaming**) are HW intensive


PostgreSQL12: TPS vs. Connections



<https://www.enterprisedb.com/blog/pgbench-performance-benchmark-postgresql-12-and-edb-advanced-server-12>

Vertical Scaling Performance

- Example: Let's Encrypt
- 21.01.2021: The Next Gen Database Servers Powering Let's Encrypt [[link](#)]
 - Providing certificates for 275m **websites**
 - “A database is at the heart of how Let’s Encrypt manages certificate issuance” - 1 single MariaDB
 - “We run the CA against a single database in order to minimize complexity” – Some read operations at replicas, one server for writes
 - 2x Xeon 24-cores running at 90%
 - Upgrade to 2x64 Epyc, on 15.09, running at 25%
 - Query 3 times faster
 - SATA → NVMe - IO from 500MB/s to 3 GB/s




Distributed Systems Motivation

- Why Distributed Systems

- Location

- Everything gets faster, latency stays
 - Physically bounded by the speed of light



<https://www.inkandswitch.com/local-first.html>

- New protocols can decrease #RT
 - Upcoming lecture
- Place services closer to user
 - Sometimes latency of 310ms is unacceptable
 - ping sydney.edu.au
 - Gaming / Esports:
 - Human reaction time 200ms
 - Total from keypress to display:
 - Thinkpad 13 ChromeOS: 70ms
 - Lenovo X1 carbon 2016: 150ms
 - TV output lag ~15-30ms (random TV)
 - Keyboard 15-60ms
- CDN: Content delivery network
 - Place your images, sites, scripts close to your users

Distributed Systems Motivation

- Why Distributed Systems
 - Fault-tolerance
 - Any hardware will crash eventually
 - Random bit flips in memory
 - **1990**: “Computers typically experience about one cosmic-ray-induced error per 256 megabytes of RAM per month”
 - **Google study 2009**: more than 8% of DIMMs affected by errors per year
 - **2007**: 44 reported memory errors (41 ECC and 3 double bit) on ~1300 nodes during a period of about 3 months
- Source
 - **Cosmic rays**
 - **Solar flares, Coronal mass ejection, Solar proton events, Background radiation**
- **Cosmic rays** may be blamed for an electronic voting error in Belgium (**2003**)
 - Bit flip in electronic voting machine
 - Added 4096 extra votes to one candidate
 - Candidate more votes than were possible




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_flare

Distributed Systems Motivation

- Influencing factors
 - Sensitivity of each transistor, number of transistors on the microchip, altitude
 - Smaller transistors leading to an increased sensitivity per transistor, but smaller cells make smaller targets
- Mars Rover?
 - Cassini reported 280 bitflip/day [link] – max 890 due to solar proton event - TMR with ~300MB RAM
 - Radiation-tolerant FPGAs → TMR
- Error-correcting code memory
 - Uses TMR or Hamming Code, correct 1 bitflip / detect 2 bitflips
 - Used for Servers, not (yet) used for consumer products

- Double bit-flips unlikely?
 - Jaguar super computer with 360TB ECC RAM
 - Double bitflip → happened every 24h
- Check your HW
 - DDR5? on-die vs. traditional ECC [link][link]



```
Terminal
draft ~ cat /sys/devices/system/edac/mc/mc/?e_count
0
0
0
0
draft ~ uptime
15:19:28 up 1 day, 19:48, 1 user, load average: 3.56, 3.10, 2.86
draft ~
```

- What can happen: e.g., expr segfaults

Distributed Systems Motivation

- HDD break [[link](#)], SSDs wear out
 - SSDs consist of NAND cells with a limited lifetime
 - An SSD disk has spare NAND that are used when cells break
 - `smartctl -a /dev/xyz`
- SLC, MLC, TLC, QLC
 - SLC: 10'000 – 100'000 write/erase cycles
 - MLC: 10'000 – write/erase cycles
 - TLC: 1'000 – write/erase cycles
 - QLC: 100 – write/erase cycles

- 100% → no spare used, I'm at 92%
 - When value is down at 0% disk capacity degrades
- E.g., Samsung 4TB drive uses QLC [[link](#)]
 - Write 100 times the same 4kb file, and cells are broken?
- Wear leveling: distribute write and erase operations across all memory cells
 - 4TB → 1b cells, write each 100 → after 100b writes, then cells are broken (TBW)
 - If wear leveling goes wrong: Samsung 990 Pro [[link](#)]
- Caching with SLC → files / cells that are frequently changed, store on SLC, once they don't change that often move to MLC/TLC/QLC

```
SMART Attributes Data Structure revision number: 1
Vendor Specific SMART Attributes with Thresholds:
ID# ATTRIBUTE_NAME          FLAG     VALUE WORST THRESH TYPE      UPDATED  WHEN_FAILED RAW_VALUE
  5 Reallocated_Sector_Ct   0x0033   100    100   010   Pre-fail Always         -         0
  9 Power_On_Hours          0x0032   096    096   000   Old_age  Always      -       18227
112 Power_Cycle_Count       0x0032   097    097   000   Old_age  Always      -       2430
177 Wear_Leveling_Count     0x0013   092    092   000   Pre-fail Always         -         288
179 Used_Rsvd_Blk_Cnt_Tot  0x0013   100    100   010   Pre-fail Always         -         0
181 Program_Fail_Cnt_Total  0x0032   100    100   010   Old_age  Always      -         0
182 Erase_Fail_Count_Total  0x0032   100    100   010   Old_age  Always      -         0
183 Runtime_Bad_Block       0x0013   100    100   010   Pre-fail Always         -         0
187 Uncorrectable_Error_Cnt 0x0032   100    100   000   Old_age  Always      -         0
190 Airflow_Temperature_Cel 0x0032   071    036   000   Old_age  Always      -        29
195 ECC_Error_Rate          0x001a   200    200   000   Old_age  Always      -         0
199 CRC_Error_Count         0x003e   099    099   000   Old_age  Always      -         15
235 POR_Recovery_Count      0x0012   099    099   000   Old_age  Always      -        682
241 Total_LBAs_Written      0x0032   099    099   000   Old_age  Always      -    3205032857
```


Distributed Systems Motivation

- Random bit flips in memory
 - Bitsquatting: DNS Hijacking without exploitation (2015)
 - Register names with single bit error, e.g,

Bitsquat Domain	Original Domain
ikamai.net	akamai.net
aeazon.com	amazon.com
a-azon.com	amazon.com
amazgn.com	amazon.com
microsmft.com	microsoft.com
micrgsoft.com	microsoft.com

- Idea: if bitflip happens, it may happen for DNS names in your memory
 - Early tests by Artem Dinaburg: “59 unique IPs per day made HTTP requests to my 32 bitsquat domains”
 - 1mio DNS queries every 24h to bitsquatted domains
- Key findings
 - Most users from China (more bitflips on Chinese machines?)
 - 240k session cookies

Fault Tolerance

- Network outages happens **often**
- 22.02.2022: Tonga Cable Successfully Repaired [[link](#)]
 - 38 days broken, see “in the news”
- 26.01.2022: Internet In Yemen Returns After Four Day Outage Caused by Saudi Air Strikes On Telco Facility [[link](#)]
 - Issue lasted 4 days, duet to Air Strike on telecom hub
- 13.01.2022: Fault Reported on Sea-MeWe-4 [[link](#)]
 - Degraded internet performance

- 10.01.2022: Svalbard Suffers Power Fault On Subsea Fiber Cable [[link](#)]
 - 1 out of 2 cables broken (redundancy!)
- [Submarine Cable Map](#)

