



OST

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Distributed Systems & Blockchain (DS1)

Authentication

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Information security – Key concepts / Access control

- Confidentiality
 - Confidentiality protects transmitted data against eavesdroppers
- Integrity
 - Provides protection against the modification of a message
- Availability
 - Data needs to be available when needed
- Non-repudiation
 - Non-repudiation provides that neither the sender nor the receiver can deny that a communication has taken place
- Identification
 - E.g. with a username “alice”, you are claiming to be Alice
- Authentication
 - Verifying a claim of identity. E.g., Alice shows passport, so another person can authenticate her. Different authentication types:
 - Something you know: things such as a PIN, a password
 - Something you have: a key, a swipe card
 - Something you are: biometrics: palm, fingerprint
- Authorization
 - Determined what resources they an authenticated user is permitted to access

Authentication

- Authentication
 - Single-factor authentication
 - E.g. password
 - Multi-factor authentication / 2FA
 - E.g. password **and** software token, [SMS](#) (15.03.2021)
- Password rules
 - Don't use:
 - The name of a pet, child, family member, or significant other
 - Anniversary dates and birthdays
 - Birthplace
 - Name of a favorite holiday
 - Something related to a favorite sports team
 - The word "password"
 - Don't reuse passwords, use password managers


- Don't enter passwords on unencrypted sites
- Password length: [password cracking with 5000\\$ in 2018](#) with [hashcat](#)
 - Hashtype: WPA/WPA2: 1190.5 kH/s

Pw length	Combinations	Time
6	11m	9s
7	656m	9m
8	38b	8h
9	$7 \cdot 10^{15}$	186y
10	$4 \cdot 10^{17}$	11ky
11	$2 \cdot 10^{19}$	665ky
12	$1 \cdot 10^{21}$	38my

- Combinations depend on [PW complexity](#)

Authentication

- Software token: TOTP (Time-based One-time Password)
 - Often used as 2nd factor, e.g., in andOTP
 - Based on keyed-hash message authentication code
 - $\sim \text{hash}(\text{key} + \text{message})$
 - $\text{TOTP}(K, T) \text{ Truncate}(\text{HMAC-SHA-256}(K, T))$
 - $K = \text{shared secret}$
 - $T = \text{Current Unix time} / X$
 - (X default is 30sec)
- Challenge Task
 - In service, e.g., your HTTP server
 - In load balance, e.g. traefik, jwt
 - Choices...



Authentication

- Basic Auth
 - Load balancer
 - Services (keep state! E.g., userlist)
- Basic Auth, only with HTTPS
 - Logout: use wrong credentials – inconsistent behavior
 - Client will provide
 - Authorization: Basic <base64>
 - <base64> contains the username:password in base64
 - `echo -n "dGVzdDp0ZXN0" | base64 -d`
- Can be encode in URL
 - `https://username:password@dsl.hsr.ch`
 - Attention:
 - <http://www.google.com:search@evil.com>
- Server will reply with header
 - WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="restricted area"
 - The user will see the information "restricted area"

Authentication

- Digest Auth

- Also available in [traefik](#)
- Hash + nonce, against replay attacks
- Server sends
 - WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="testrealm@host.com",
...
nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093",
...
- Client sends in HTTP header
 - Authorization: Digest username="Alice",
realm="testrealm@host.com",
nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093",
uri="/dir/index.html",
...
response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1"

- Advantages

- PW not in clear text ([MD5](#)), can be "SHA-256", "SHA-256-sess", "SHA-512" and "SHA-512-sess"
 - [sess](#): "session key" for "authentication session"
- Nonce for replay protection for client and server

- Disadvantages

- Browser L&F
- Cannot use `script` or `bcrypt` to store PWs

Authentication

- Public/private key
- Create SSL CA certificates for server with openssl command

```
# This will return a 403 to all clients without a proper certificate
if ($ssl_client_verify != "SUCCESS") { return 403; }
```

```
# This tells Nginx what CA to verify against
ssl_client_certificate /tmp/ca.pem;
```

```
# This tells Nginx to verify clients
ssl_verify_client on;
```


- Create CA

```
#generate CA certificate and private key
openssl req -new -nodes -x509 -keyout ca.key -
newkey rsa:4096 -out ca.pem -days 3650
```


- Create certificate

```
# create signing request
openssl req -new -nodes -keyout user.key -newkey
rsa:4096 -out user.pem
# sign the previous request
openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in user.pem -CA
ca.pem -CAkey ca.key -set_serial 01 -out user.crt
# convert to pkcs12 format
openssl pkcs12 -export -out user.pfx -inkey
user.key -in user.crt -certfile ca.pem
```

- Add nginx security in your local network
 - proxy_ssl_certificate, proxy_ssl_certificate_key



Authentication




The screenshot shows the Firefox Certificate Manager dialog box. The 'Your Certificates' tab is active, displaying a table of certificates. The table has columns for Certificate Name, Security D..., Serial Number, and Expires On. A certificate is listed under the 'HSR-test CA' organization with the name 'localhost', serial number 'Software Sec... 01', and expiration date 'March 24, 2...'. Below the table are buttons for 'View...', 'Backup...', 'Backup All...', 'Import...', and 'Delete...'. An 'OK' button is at the bottom right. The background shows the Firefox 'Certificates' settings page with options like 'Ask you every time' selected.

Certificate Name	Security D...	Serial Number	Expires On
- HSR-test CA			
localhost	Software Sec...	01	March 24, 2...

- Add client cert to Firefox
- Used self-signed certificates (for testing)
 - Alternative Let's encrypt

Authentication

- Session-based authentication (stateful)
 - Sticky session




- `org.apache.catalina.session.StandardManager` based on `ConcurrentHashMap`
- JSON Web Token ([JWT](#)) (stateless)

- E.g., spring-boot
 - Simple login app
 - JSESSIONID, Session information, that user was successfully authenticated: [memory](#)


- JSON-based access tokens ([jwt.io](#))
 - All server instances know a secret token / public key
 - When user logs in, server send back token
 - Client sends: `Authorization: Bearer <token>`
 - `const user_token = base64urlEncoding(header) + '.' + base64urlEncoding(payload) + '.' + base64urlEncoding(signature)`

Authentication

- JSON-based access tokens
 - Header: {"alg": "HS256"}
 - Payload: {"sub": "tom", "role": "admin", "exp": 1422779638}
- Signature (simple): keyed-hash message
 - $\sim \text{hash}(\text{base64}(\text{header}) + \text{base64}(\text{payload}) + \text{secret token})$
- Client can store user_token in
 - `localStorage.setItem("token", userToken);`
- Example in golang with [JWT](#)
 - Tutorial: [here](#) and [here](#)
- [OAuth](#) - protocol for authorization 3rd party integration
 - Grant access on other websites without giving them the passwords



Access Token / Refresh Token



Access Token / Refresh Token


- Access Token only short lifetime, e.g., 10min.
 - If public key / secret is known, the content in the token can be trusted, e.g., in the service
 - Can have userId, role, etc.
 - No need to query DB for those information, e.g.:

```
type TokenClaims struct {  
    MailFrom string `json:"mail_from,omitempty"`  
    MailTo   string `json:"mail_to,omitempty"`  
    jwt.Claims  
}
```

- Refresh Token longer lifetime, e.g., 6 month
 - A refresh token is used to get a new access token
 - IAM / Auth server creates access tokens

- Only access token, with long lifetime
 - If a user credential is revoked – how to inform every service?
- Only refresh token
 - Tightly coupled Service/Auth, every request to Service, Auth needs to be involved for every access
- Access + Refresh token
 - If a user credential is revoked, user has max. 10min more to access service
 - Auth only involved if access token is expired
- Authorization Code Flow with Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)

OAuth PKCE Flow



Example Auth Server

- Fastauth

- Simple authentication server that can also be used for local development
- Start with (also starts LDAP)
 - go build
 - ./fastauth -dev test -rs256 false -ed256 false
 - Login:
http://localhost:8080/oauth/authorize?response_type=code
- PKCE
 - Login:
 - http://localhost:8080/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&code_challenge=fNcHfbUCOvMuzmkBK7c2MR_8TK_lq6tHDXTJL6qcAco&code_challenge_method=S256

- Copy code from browser

- curl -X POST -H 'Accept: application/json' --data 'grant_type=authorization_code' --data "code=\${CODE}" --data 'code_verifier=HalloDasIstEinTest123456789012345678901234567890'

<http://localhost:8080/oauth/token>

- Now you have the access token
- Example Client with jwt.io
 - example-hello -hs256 test

Authorization Challenge Task

- Minimal Requirement
 - Check a JWT token, token can be generated elsewhere – e.g., jwt.io
 - Can be checked in Service, in [LB](#) (traefik only for enterprise version, nginx with plus)

```
[authSources.jwtSource.jwt]
signingSecret = "super-secret"
```

- Validate in the service

```
func jwtAuth(next func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, claims *TokenClaims))
func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
    return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
        if authHeader == "" {
            writeErr(...)
            return
        }
        bearerToken := strings.Split(authHeader, " ")
        if len(bearerToken) != 2 {
            writeErr(...)
            return
        }
        tok, err := jwt.ParseSigned(bearerToken[1])
        if err != nil {
            writeErr(...)
            return
        }
        claims := &TokenClaims{}
        if tok.Headers[0].Algorithm == "HS256" {
            err = tok.Claims(jwtKey, claims)
        } else {
            writeErr(...)
            return
        }
        if err != nil {
            writeErr(...)
            return
        }
        if claims.Expiry != nil && !claims.Expiry.Time().After(time.Now()) {
            writeErr(...)
            return
        }
        next(w, r, claims)
    }
}
```